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IS SILENCE SACRED? THE VULNERABILITY OF GRIFFIN V. 
CALIFORNIA IN A TERRORIST WORLD 
Lissa Griffin' 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination (hereafter "the privilege") has been neither clear nor consistent.' 
For one thing, as many commentators have noted, analysis of the privilege has been 
"tyrannized by  slogan^."^ The Court's privilege jurisprudence has been marked by 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Vicki 
Gannon and Linda D'Agostino for their research support, and Iris Mercado for her unflag- 
ging assistance. This Article was written with the support of the Pace University Faculty 
Scholarship Fund. 
' See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,56 n.5 (1964) ("'[Tlhe law and 
the lawyers . . . have never made up their minds just what it is supposed to do or just whom 
it is intended to protect."' (quoting Harry Kalven Jr., Invoking the Fifrh Amendment-Some 
Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC. SCI. 181, 182 (1953))). 
The concept of silence being "sacred" is adapted from an article by Judge Henry Friendly, 
in which he proposed amending the Fifth Amendment, The Fifih Amendment Tomorrow: The 
Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968). In that article he quotes the 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION F JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OFCRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 307 ( 1967), which raised a similar suggestion 
and noted that "'the Constitution contemplates amendment, and no part of it should be so 
sacred that it remains beyond review."' Friendly, supra, at 672 n.5. 
This Article addresses the Fifth Amendment privilege as it has been applied to prohibit 
judicial or prosecutorial comment on a defendant's decision to remain silent at trial. See GnBn 
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held that such comment was 
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. It does not address the impeachment or evidentiary use 
of a defendant's pre-trial silence. 
See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,261 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (the 
roots of the privilege "go to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to the state"); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (the ideas underlying the privilege "tap the basic stream of 
religious and political principle"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,631-32 (1886) (to 
allow the government to compel the production of incriminating papers is "contrary to the 
principles of free government" and inconsistent with "political liberty and personal freedom"); 
see also Friendly, supra note 1, at 679 (commenting on "the extent to which eloquent phrases 
have been accepted as a substitute for thorough thought"); Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination 
and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193,209 (examining Supreme Court cases and con- 
cluding that, "[llanguage like this [that the privilege is a linchpin of an accusatorial system] 
no matter how often repeated, no matter how eloquently intoned, is merely restatement of the 
privilege itself '). 
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broad, high-sounding rhetoric that has not always matched an equally broad interpre- 
tation of the right. For another, the Court has exhibited two distinct and inconsistent 
approaches to the privilege. One approach interprets it broadly as the linchpin of an 
accusatorial system that insures that the government bears the burden of proving guilt 
without any help from the defenda~~t.~ The other approach, based on text and history, 
interprets the privilege more narrowly as a protection against coercive methods of 
interrogation only.4 While in practice the two approaches often produce the same 
result, they clash in one important context-when the government is allowed to use 
a defendant's silence at trial as substantive evidence of guilt. Under the Supreme 
Court's decision in Gn@n v. Califomia~ that use is not allowed: a prosecutor's com- 
ment to the jury on a defendant's failure to testify violates the pri~ilege.~ 
In its most recent foray in this area, its 1999 decision in United States v.  itche ell? 
the Supreme Court extended Gn#in's nocornrnent rule to sentencing, refusing to allow 
the sentencing court to rely on a defendant's silence to prove facts relevant to sen- 
t e n ~ e . ~  The Court held, inter alia, that the refusal to allow use of a defendant's silence 
to prove the prosecution's case was one of the hallmarks of the U.S. criminal accu- 
satory proce~s .~  Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
0' Connor and Justice Thomas. lo Justice Scalia argued that Gnfin lacked historical 
and textual support, had been a constitutional "wrong turn," and should not be ex- 
tended." Justice Thomas also dissented, but he argued that Gnfin should be over- 
ruled outright.'' 
As the Mitchell decision indicates, several reasons demonstrate the need to re- 
evaluate the constitutional basis for the no-comment rule at this time. The first reason 
is the uncertain mooring of the privilege doctrinally, as represented in the opinions 
in Mitchell. The second reason is the narrow majority in Mitchell for extending Gn#in, 
the explicit or implicit willingness to overrule Gn'Bn by two members of the Court, 
and the recent departure and replacement of two Justices in the Mitchell majority. The 
third reason is the privilege's perpetually disfavored status as an anti-truth-seeking 
See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 3 14 (1999); see also, Friendly, supra note 
1,  at 671-72 (commenting that this view "has become a kind of obsession which has stretched 
the privilege beyond not only its language and history but any justification in policy, and threat- 
ens to go further still"). 
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: Zke Right to Remain 
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625,2625-29 (1996). 
GrifSin, 380 U.S. 609. 
Id. 
' 526 U.S. 314. 
Id. at 315. 
See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
lo Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 316. 
I '  Id. at 336. 
l 2  Id. at 341-42. 
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right.I3 Finally, of course, this disfavored status is particularly dangerous in light 
of the modem threat of domestic terr~rism.'~ A re-evaluation of the no-comment 
rule may be significantly aided by examining the United Kingdom's approach to the 
privilege, particularly its approach to using a defendant's silence at trial. Unlike the 
situation in the United States, in the United Kingdom, where there is no written con- 
stitutional text, the fact-finder is allowed to use a defendant's silence as proof of guilt." 
While the United States and the United Kingdom share a significant history with 
respect to the privilege, a history that established the right as an integral part of both 
criminal processes, the histories diverge following the colonial period. From that 
point onward, the United States construed the privilege more broadly as a limitation 
on the powers of govemment.I6 This uniquely U.S. experience-and one that con- 
tinued into the twentieth century-explains, to some extent, the differences that exist 
today. The other explanation is the United Kingdom's experience with Northern 
Ireland terrorism, an experience that ultimately changed not only criminal procedures 
relating to terrorists, but mainstream U.K. criminal procedure as well. It remains to 
be seen whether the U.S. experience with terrorism will lead to similar changes here. 
Part I of this Article traces the shared history of the right against self-incrimination 
from twelfth-century England to the mid-twentieth century. Part I1 examines the 
modem history of the privilege in the United States, from the Supreme Court's 1965 
decision in Grifin to its 1999 decision in Mitchell. Part Ill examines the United 
Kingdom's modem approach to the privilege, including its re-shaping of the priv- 
ilege in response to domestic terrorism. Part IV examines why the U.S. and U.K. 
systems, with a common history and shared values, have moved in such dramatically 
different directions with respect to the privilege. Part V assesses the possibility that 
the privilege, already vulnerable, will be curtailed by the new Court along the lines 
of the United Kingdom's procedures. 
l 3  See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 1, at 679-80 (while other privileges may retard the search 
for truth, the Fifth Amendment privilege extends only to people who may have broken the law, 
defies the "notions of decent conduct," and prevents restitution to the victim); Roscoe Pound, 
Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 .I. CW. L. & C W O ~ Y  
1014,1015 (1934) (the privilege does not help the innocent but serves the evil designs of the 
guilty who are well advised by counsel to employ it). Indeed, in noting the expansive inter- 
pretation of the privilege, Professor Wigmore prophesied that "a reaction must come. A true 
conservatism must recommence to operate." JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 225 1, at 
3 102 (1 st ed. 1904). That has not happened yet, although it is more likely now, as occurred 
in the United Kingdom, see infra pp. 949-55, in light of the threat of domestic terrorism. See 
infra pp. 955-58. 
l4 Several commentators have noted the responsiveness of the privilege to contemporary 
events. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 13, $225 1, at 3 102 ("Neither the history of the privi- 
lege, nor its firm constitutional anchorage, need deter us fromdiscussing at this day its policy."); 
Friendly, supra note 1, at 678 ('The privilege has always been responsive to the particular 
needs and problems of the time."). 
Is See infra Part 111. 
l6 For a full discussion of this historical period, see infra Part I. 
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I. SHARED HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE 
A. Introduction 
Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum-no man is bound to accuse himself-the rule 
is ancient and has been interpreted in many different and inconsistent ways. Although 
no one knows its European origin, it is likely that the privilege began as a limitation 
on the duty to confess one's sins-to accuse one's self without charge-in the eccle- 
siastic courts. It first appeared in the twelfth century English system of criminal justice. 
Throughout its early English history, the privilege represented the battleground be- 
tween the ecclesiastic courts and the royal prerogative, as the common law courts were 
called upon to exercise control over the ecclesiastic courts and their coercive practices. 
It also represented the difference between both the accusatory and inquisitorial systems, 
and among the common law, canon law, and civil law. 
B. Confession v. Incrimination 
Early on, defendants in England and on the European continent (the ius commune)" 
were expected to speak and were regularly interrogated in an effort to establish their 
guilt. Without any charges being brought or any evidence to support any charges, citi- 
zens were brought to ecclesiastical courts, made to swear an oath, and questioned about 
their religious beliefs and practices.18 The purpose of the oath was to find a basis for 
charging a defendant, that is, to get a confession to some ecclesiastical wrong that 
could then serve as the basis for bringing criminal charges.19 The earliest form of the 
doctrine of nemo tenetur was intended only to prevent self-accusation by physical tor- 
ture (secular coercion) or oath ex officio (ecclesiastical coercion).20 
By the seventeenth century, the privilege had evolved to include "a right not to 
be interrogated [in the ecclesiastical courts] under oath in the absence of well-grounded 
su~picion."~' The ecclesiastical courts could conduct incriminating interrogation but 
only after there was evidence of criminal conduct and a charge had been brought." 
One had to be accused of something, and imposition of a general oath to answer any 
and all questions asked was banned.23 In short, then, what was not allowed was what 
l7 R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: TS ORIGINS 
AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (1997) ("The term ius commune, translated literally as 'common law,' 
refers to the combination of the Roman and Canon laws that was the product of the revival 
of juristic science in the twelfth century."). 
l8 Id. at 101. 
l9 Id. at 62. 
20 Friendly, supra note 1, at 677. 
Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2640; see also HELMHOE ET AL., supra note 17, at 61. 
22 HELMHOE ET AL., supra note 17, at 61. 
23 Id. at 61-62. 
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would be known today as a "fishing e~pedition."~~ The rule also prohibited the call- 
ing of a person into court for the purpose of examining the "secret thoughts of his 
heart, or . . . his secret opinion."25 In other words, no one could be called into court 
and questioned in an effort to establish heresy. Finally, the rule prohibited exami- 
nation under oath in all except testamentary or matrimonial cases.26 
C. The Ex Oficio Oath: The Marian Inquisition and the Puritans 
In the early seventeenth century, Puritanism and the common-law courts joined 
forces to protest the administration of the oath ex officio in the ecclesiastical High 
Cornrni~sion.~~ The use of the oath had evolved beyond forcing someone to reveal 
the basis for his own accusation to requiring actual testimony against one's self. This 
practice was viewed as "an outrage on human dignity and a violation of the very in- 
stinct of self-pre~ervation."~~ Opposition to the oath had become both religious and 
secular: it was based on the belief that the Bible prohibited swearing in God's name, 
that the requirement of an oath violated conscience, and that the oath permitted re- 
ligious persecution without proper accusation by witnesses or a grand jury.29 
John Lilburne is credited with the final abolition of the oath ex o f f i ~ i o . ~ ~  Lilburne 
was made to take the oath in the Star Chamber, which bound him to answer all ques- 
tions posed to him.3' He refused to answer any "'impertinent questions, for fear that 
with my answer I may do myself hurt.""" Others followed his example.33 As a result, 
the courts recognized a right that did not prohibit inquiry or prevent self-incrimination 
but that did permit a defendant to refuse to answer any questions without penalty.34 
Under the statute of 1640, the practice of interrogating defendants under oath in the 
ecclesiastical courts was pr~hibited.~' With the abolition of the Star Chamber and the 
High Commission soon after, in 1641, the common law courts had gained supremacy 
over coercive ecclesiastical practice^.^^ 
Interestingly, no sooner had the right to refuse to answer been recognized then it 
became virtually useless in light of the disqualification of an accused from testifymg. 
Moreover, while the new right to refuse to answer incriminating questions did impose 
" Id. at 62. 
25 Id. at 63. 
26 Id. at 63-64. 
27 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 262-63 (1968). 
28 Id at 263. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 271-72. 
3' Id. at 274. 
32 Id. at 273. For a full discussion of the proceedings against Lilburne, see id. at 271-78. 
'3 Id. at 278. 
34 Id. at 282. 
3' Id. at 278-82. 
36 Id. at 281-83. 
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some limitations on pre-trial interrogation, it did not prohibit it.37 The Marian 
Committal Statute of 1555 remained in effect and required justices of the peace, who 
were prosecutors as well as justices, to examine suspects and to record anything ma- 
The record of such examination was then read into trial against the defen- 
dant.39 Such suspects, however, could not be forced to take an oath, because the oath 
was viewed as coerci~n.~' Coerced or extorted confessions could not be used, largely 
because they were deemed ur~reliable.~' However, "until the mid-eighteenth century, 
the record of the . . . examination was read routinely at . . . If the defendant had 
refused to speak to the justice of the peace-as was his or her right-this fact would 
be reported to the jury.43 
Coercive practices also existed at trial. Although defendants charged with felo- 
nies could not be compelled to speak at trial, they were not entitled to counsel and, as 
a practical matter, they were expected to respond to the prosecution's evidence and 
prove their innocence."" Most defendants therefore defended themselves by answer- 
ing questions or rebutting witnesses. While the trial judges tried to help the defen- 
dants, a defendant's silence was inevitably suicidal, since there was no one else to help 
conduct a defense.45 
Thus, by the colonial era, although the accused had a right to silence, as a prac- 
tical matter he was expected to be a source of at least unsworn evidence pretrial, which 
could be read into the record at trial. Certainly in this era there was no prohibition 
against use of his silence at trial.46 
D. British North America 
These same conditions existed in the colonies. Indeed, British North Americans 
claimed no more than the rights of English subjects and English common law. As in 
England, only two protections existed: absent well-grounded suspicion, a suspect had 
a right to silence; and suspects could not be subjected to torture or physical coercion 
or forced to take an oath.47 The Body of Liberties of 164 1 (Liberty 45) stated that tor- 
ture could not be used to secure a confession except after conviction in capital cases 
37 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 91. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2649. 
4' LEVY, supra note 27, at 328. 
42 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2654. 
43 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
" For a thorough description of the criminal trial during this period, see HELMHOLZ~ AL., 
supra note 17, at 82-96. 
45 Id. at 107. 
46 Id. at 92. 
47 Id. at 121. 
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to find  conspirator^.^^ But even in that circumstance there could be no "~]arbarous 
and inhumane" torture.49 Again, following the Marian procedures, justices of the peace 
were expected to elicit a confession from the defendant that could be used against him 
at a trial, but only if he had not been sworn.50 These interrogation procedures were 
well established and widely accepted." 
E. The Fifh Amendment 
As noted above, when the Constitution was drafted, it was not meant to reform the 
law. Instead, it was intended to protect existing procedures from the whims of the 
distant king, i.e. to protect the status quo from incursions by the The King 
had begun to use the vice-admiralty procedures to try ordinary criminal offenses on 
land.53 These were military courts, presided over by judges from England, and relied 
upon the hated oath ex officio." They did not allow juries.55 Ultimately, Parliament 
threatened to re-enact Henry VIII's Treason Act, which required that the trials actually 
take place in England.56 
In the face of these increasingly intrusive imperial measures, the rhetoric of in- 
dividual rights increased in intensity. Clearly, however, the cluster of individual 
rights ultimately embodied in the Bill of Rights was intended as defensive, not as 
ref~rm.~'  The Virginia Declaration of Rights contained similar provisions, and other 
state constitutions reflected this rights cluster as well.58 In this historical context, the 
Fifth Amendment was born. 
F. Nineteenth Century Developments 
Despite U.S. independence, the right to remain silent continued to be treated simi- 
larly by both the United States and the United Kingdom. The development of the 
no-comment rule in the nineteenth century was influenced by (1) the appearance of 
defense counsel; (2) the abolition of the defendant and disqualification based on in- 
terest; and (3) the creation of a statutory no-comment rule. 
48 LEVY, supra note 27, at 344-45. 
49 Id. 
Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2649 & nn.86-88. 
" LEVY, supra note 27, at 3 3 3 4 ;  Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2655 & n.108. 
52 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 129-33. 
53 Id. at 131-33. 
54 Id. 
S5 Id. at 131. 
56 Id. at 133. 
'' Id. at 134-35. 
s8 Id. 
Heinonline - -  15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 933 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7  
934 WILLIAM & MARY B~LL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 15:927 
1. The Role of Defense Counsel 
In both the U.S. and U.K. systems lawyers began to appear more frequently, al- 
lowing the defendant to take a more passive role. Thus, at this point, "the dignity of 
defendants lay not in their ability to tell their stories fully, but rather in their ability 
to remain passive, to proclaim to the prosecutor 'Thou sayest,' and to force the state 
to shoulder the entire load."5g As defendants were allowed and expected to participate 
less, they began to be seen as potential victims of state c~ercion.~' 
Nevertheless, in the United States the pre-trial Marian Committal procedures con- 
tinued. Suspects continued to be questioned, unsworn, before trial and their state- 
ments or silence used in evidence at trial.6' 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom after the American revolution, reformers in 
Parliament began to argue that requiring the defendant to speak was unfair to un- 
educated and inarticulate defendants who could not tell their stories The 
reformers argued for an increased role of counsel to protect these defendants, and 
thus, in 1836, the right to counsel was secured.63 Similar to what was occurring in the 
United States at the time, defendants were able to take a more passive role at trial.@ 
Then, in 1848, Sir John Jervis's Act made a substantial change to the pre-trial Marian 
Committal procedures: for the first time, an accused was required to be cautioned, 
before pretrial questioning, that he need not answer any questions and that if he did 
answer, his answers could be used against him at trial.65 
2. Abolition of the Disqualification for Interest 
The next significant step was the abolition of the testimonial disqualification of 
defendants. Maine was the first U.S. jurisdiction to allow defendants to offer sworn 
testimony in criminal cases, in 1 864.66 By the end of the 1890s, Georgia was the only 
state to disqualify defendants!' 
Abolition of the disqualification was hotly contested on both continents. In the 
United States, those in favor of abolition argued that the disqualification presumed 
guilt and a willingness to commit pe jury!' Those in opposition argued that abolition 
would force defendants to speak, contrary to the Fifth ~ m e n d m e n t . ~ ~  They argued that 
- 
" Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2660. 
Id. 
61 Id. at 2654-55. 
62 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 96. 
63 Id. at 147. 
64 Id. at 144, 147. 
65 Id. at 169-70. 
66 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2661. 
67 Id. 
Id. 
69 Id. 
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the failure of a defendant to testify would be seen as a confession of guilt and that 
jurors would draw this inference regardless of any instructions they might receive.70 
To avoid the inference, many defendants would commit perjury." 
3. The Statutory No-Comment Rules 
In deference to these concerns, the federal statute of 1878, and many others, gave 
the defendant a right to testifi, provided that the prosecutor could not comment on the 
failure of a defendant to teshfy, and prohibited any presumption against the defendant 
from his failure to take the stand.72 In Wilson v. United ~tates,'~ the Supreme Court 
reversed a federal conviction based on a prosecutor's argument that the defendant's 
silence was evidence of guilt.74 The no,omment rule was determined to be statutory. 
At no time in that opinion or elsewhere did the Court hold that a negative inference 
from silence was prohibited by the Constituti~n.~~ 
Indeed, in Twining v. New ~ e r s e ~ ~ ~  and Adamson v. the Supreme 
Court explicitly held that state rules permitting adverse comment on a defendant's 
failure to testify at trial were not prohibited by the Due Process Clause. In Twining, 
the Court held that the state law permitting a prosecutor to argue for an adverse infer- 
ence from a defendant's silence at trial did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process In Adamson, the Court reached the same conclusion when it refused 
to hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was an element 
~ - 
of due process that could bind the states.79 In so holding, it assumed, but did not de- 
cide, that the Fifth Amendment would prohibit such comment in a federal proceed- 
ing." At this point in history, then, there was no authority to support the conclusion 
70 Id. 
7 1  Id. at 2661-62. 
72 Id. at 2662 (citing Act of Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 3481 
(1994))). 
73 149 U.S. 60 (1893). 
74 Id. at 66-67. 
75 See, e.g., id at 64. Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that drawing adverse inferences 
from selective silence by a testifying defendant, see Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 
(1 9 17), and impeaching a defendant's testimony by disclosing his silence at an earlier trial, see 
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), were consistent with the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. 
76 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
77 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
78 Twining, 21 1 U.S. at 114. 
79 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 46-47. In a series of cases, the Court continued to reaffirm that 
the self-incrimination privilege in the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states. See Knapp 
v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371,374 (1958); Pako v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937), 
overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97 (1934), overruled b y  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
Adamson, 322 U.S. at 50-51. 
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that the right against self-incrimination prohibited comment on a defendant's failure 
to testify. 
In the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, the English counterpart of the U.S. Act of 
1 878,81 the United Kingdom abolished the disqualification based on interest and the 
no-comment rule. Similar to the U.S. act, the Criminal Evidence Act stated that "'the 
failure of any person charged with an offence, or of the wife or husband, as the case 
may be, of the person so charged, to give evidence shall not be made the subject of 
any comment by the prosec~tion."'~~ 
Now that defendants could testify, the courts were faced with a quandary. Was 
the "witness rule," i.e., the rule of evidence that permitted witnesses (but not defen- 
dants) aprivilege against self-incrimination that was not waived by partial answers now 
applicable to defendant-witnes~es?~~ Or should the defendant's testimony be subject 
to the "confession rule," under which the privilege was waived by partial answer but 
an incriminatory statement by a defendant would be excluded if given under duress?84 
Essentially, the U.K. courts merged the two doctrines: the "witness rule" was extended 
to defendants, but it was given the exclusionary and waiver principles of the "con- 
fession rule."85 Where a defendant testified as a witness he or she retained a privilege 
against self-incrimination that was waived by partial answers; any testimony given 
could be excluded if given under duress.86 In this context, the giving of an oath was 
considered duress' per ~ e . ~ '  Thus, defendants could not be made to testify at trial. 
11. THE MODERN U.S. PRIVILEGE 
A. Incorporation Through the Due Process Clause 
Ultimately in 1964, the federal statutory nocomment rule was constitutionalized. 
In Malloy v. Hogan, the Supreme Court finally held that the privilege against self- 
incrimination was protected against state action by incorporation in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth ~ m e n d m e n t . ~ ~  Malloy did not involve the nocomment rule. 
In Malloy, the petitioner pled guilty to state charges of selling pools. After his guilty 
plea he was ordered to testify before a referee investigating gambling.89 Petitioner 
" Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2662; Carol A. Chase, Hearing the "Sounds of Silence" in 
Criminal Trials: A Look at Recent British Law Refonns With an Eye Toward Reforming the 
American Criminal Justice System, 44 U .  KAN. L. REV. 929,933-35 (1996). 
82 Chase, supra note 8 1, at 934 (quoting Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, Eliz. § l(a) (Eng.)). 
83 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 156-61. 
84 Id. at 153-56. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 162, 171-74. 
87 Id. at 174. 
88 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
89 Id. at 3. 
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invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.* The lower court held that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege was not available to a witness in a state proceeding?' However, 
re-examining and overruling its decisions in Adamson and Twining, the Supreme Court 
held that the federal Fifth Amendment privilege was binding on the states through 
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process In doing so, the 
Court rejected the suggestion that a less stringent constitutional standard applied to 
the states, and required state conformity with the entire federal standard.93 
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, dissented." The dissenters took issue with 
the Court's approach of "incorporating into due process, without critical examination, 
the whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed against the 
Federal ~overnment ."~~ To Justice Harlan, the Court's precedent established that the 
standard for incorporation of any part of the Bill of Rights was due process.96 Rights 
that have been applied to both federal and state equally, for example, First Amendment 
or Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel protections, were applied equally because the 
fundamental fairness of due process demanded it. According to Justice Harlan, the 
basic structure of federalism prohibited the kind of uniformity that the Court's de- 
cision would require of the states.97 
1. Grifin v. California 
In 1964, the Court re-considered the specific question posed in Twining and 
Adamson: whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited a prosecutor in 
a state criminal trial from arguing, and a court from inviting a jury to draw an unfavor- 
able inference from a defendant's failure to testify. In Grifin, a murder prosecution, 
the prosecutor, relying on a California statute, had argued to the jury in summation 
that the defendant, who had not testified but who had been with the victim before her 
death and was the only person who could provide details related to the murder, had 
- 
90 Id. 
9' Id. 
92 Id. at 2-3. 
93 Id. at 11 ("It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity 
of a claim of privilege . . . depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal 
court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a 
federal or state proceeding is justified."). 
94 Id. at 14. Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented separately on the ground that 
the privilege had not been properly invoked because there was insufficient evidence that re- 
spondent had a "reasonable apprehension" of self-incrimination. Id. at 34, 38. 
95 Id. at 16. 
96 Id. at 16-17. 
97 Id. at 28. Referring to the above noted argument, Justice Harlan said, "Such 'incongruity,' 
however, is at the heart of our federal system. The powers and responsibilities of the state 
and federal governments are not congruent; under our Constitution, they are not intended to 
be." Id. at 27. 
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"not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain."98 In addition, in accordance with 
the statute,99 the trial court had instructed the jury that "a defendant has a constitutional 
right not to testify" and the defendant's silence did not "create a presumption of guilt 
nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its bur- 
den of proof."'00 However, the state court then charged that, as to the facts within the 
defendant's knowledge, "the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending 
to indicate the truth of [the state's] evidence and as indicating that among the infer- 
ences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are 
the more pr~bable."'~' 
In an opinion by Justice Douglas for a five-member majority, the Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction, with Justice Harlan concurring, Justices Stewart and White 
dissenting, and Chief Justice Warren taking no part.Io2 Calling adverse comment on 
silence a remnant of "the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,'"'03 the Court held 
that the instruction created a penalty for the decision to remain silent that "cuts down 
on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'04 
The Griffin decision is an unusual one, remarkably oblique. It begins by stating, 
"[ilf this were a federal trial, reversible error would have been corn~nitted."'~~ The 
Court based its conclusion on Wilson v. United ~ t a t e s , "~  a decision it acknowledged 
rested on an act of Congress and not the Fifth ~mendment.'~' It went on to hold, how- 
ever, that the prosecutor's comment and the court's instructions also violated the Fifth 
~mendrnent."~ The majority did not, however, rest its conclusion on history, prev- 
alence, or actual text, the analytical bases for constitutional analysis.'@ Rather, the 
Court continued, 
If the words 'Fifth Amendment' are substituted for 'act' and for 
'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected. 
98 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,611 (1965). 
99 Id. at 609-10 (citing CAL. CONST. art I, 8 13 (repealed 1974)). 
'00 Id. at 610. 
1°1 Id. 
'02 Id. at 609,615,617. 
lo' Id. at 614 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964)). 
'04 Id. 
'" Id. at 612. 
'06 149 U.S. 60 (1893). 
lo' Grifin, 380 U.S. 612-13; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Bruno 
v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). 
Io8 Gnfin, 380 U.S. at 613. The Court noted that the federal statute was designed in part 
to protect those "who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law 
gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture 
on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him." Id. (citing Wilson, 
149 U.S. at 66). 
Io9 See id. 
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For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'in- 
quisitorial system of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amend- 
ment  outlaw^."^ 
Having converted a statutory enactment into a constitutional one, the Court then 
relied on precedent to impose that standard on the states: 
We said in Malloy v. Hogan that 'the same standards must de- 
termine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state 
proceeding is justified.' We take that in its literal sense and hold 
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal 
Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prose- 
cution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that 
such silence is evidence of guilt."' 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan began by agreeing that the Fifth Amend- 
ment would bar adverse comment on a defendant's silence in federal court."* He also 
agreed, in light of Malloy's holding incorporating the Fifth Amendment against the 
states, that there was "no legitimate escape from today's de~ision.""~ He thus con- 
curred in the majority decision, but explained: 
I do so, however, with great reluctance, since for me the decision 
exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent 
adoption of the 'incorporation' doctrine is infecting the operation 
of the federal system. 
. . . .  
While I would agree that the accusatorial rather than inquisitorial 
process is a fundamental part of the 'liberty' guaranteed by the 
"O Id. at 613-14 (citation omitted). 
It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to 
facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural 
and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that 
inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. What the 
jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may 
infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence 
against him is quite another. 
Id. at 614. 
I" Id. at 615 (citation omitted). The Court reserved decision on whether such an instruction 
would be constitutionally required if requested Id. at 615 n.6. 
Id. at 615. 
' I 3  Id. at615-16. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, my Brother Stewart in dissent, . . . fully 
demonstrates that the no-comment rule 'might be lost, and 
justice still be done.' As a 'non-fundamental' part of the Fifth 
Amendment, I would not, but for Malloy, apply the no-comment 
rule to the States.'14 
Justice Harlan noted that the incongruity, within fundamental fairness limits, be- 
tween state and federal standards "is at the heart of our federal system. The powers 
and responsibilities of the State and Federal Governments are not congruent, and 
under the Constitution they are not intended to be."'15 He concluded, "Although com- 
pelled to concur in this decision, I am free to express the hope that the Court will even- 
tually return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed throughout 
its hi~tory.""~ 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, dissented.'17 He focused on a textual anal- 
ysis, and framed the central issue as whether anything in the California statute "com- 
pelled" Griffin to be a witness against himself."* Of course, Justice Stewart noted, 
Griffin did not testify, so he could not have been compelled to do so.'19 Moreover, 
Justice Stewart disputed the majority's conclusion that the comment rule compelled tes- 
timony by imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right to remain silent.120 Accord- 
ing to him, a jury is aware on its own, that a defendant has not testified; a prosecutor's 
comment and a court's charge do not create that awareness.12' Thus, he concluded 
that the Court must be looking at some other compulsion which "the Court does not 
describe and which I cannot readily perceive."'22 Relying, then, on history,'23 Justice 
Id. at 616 (citations omitted). 
I I 5  Id. 
Id. at 617. 
1' Id. 
Id. at 620. 
Il9 Id. 
IZ0 Id. at 620-21. 
"I Id. at 621. 
IZ2 Id. 
Id. at 620. Contrasting the California procedure to those of the Star Chamber, Justice 
Stewart continued: 
When a suspect was brought before the Court of High Commission or 
the Star Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was asked 
of him, and subjected to a far-reaching and deeply probing inquiry in an 
effort to ferret out some unknown and frequently unsuspected crime. He 
declined to answer on pain of incarceration, banishment, or mutilation. 
And if he spoke falsely, he was subject to further punishment. Faced 
with this formidable array of alternatives, his decision to speak was un- 
questionably coerced. 
Id. 
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Stewart concluded that, "if any compulsion be detected in the California procedure, 
it is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature than that involved in the 
procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment g~arantee.""~ 
Indeed, Justice Stewart viewed the court's instruction as a legitimate means of 
articulating and bringing into the light of rational discussion a fact 
inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness. The California 
procedure is not only designed to protect the defendant against 
unwarranted inferences which might be drawn by an uninformed 
jury; it is also an attempt by the State to recognize and articulate 
what it believes to be the natural probative force of certain facts.lZ5 
Finally, Justice Stewart noted that the Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules 
of Evidence, the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute had all 
endorsed the use of the California pr~cedure . '~~  
2. Applying the Rule 
The next decision on the nocomrnent rule, following Gnfin; was Tehan v. ~h0tt . l~ '  
In Tehan, the Court held that Gnfin was not to be applied retroactively because it was 
not based on protection of the accuracy of the truth-seeking function of a trial.128 In 
so holding, the Court abandoned the idea that the no-comment rule was a protection 
for the inn~cent,"~ but rather explained that it is based on the "complex of values" the 
privilege represents.130 Those values exist independent of the truth-seeking function 
of a trial, and include the right to individual autonomy, a right to be left alone by the 
government, and a right to require the government to bear its burden of proof without 
-- 
124 Id. 
Id. at 622. 
126 Id. at 622 & nn.6-7; see Andrew A. Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of 
the Defendant to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REV. 226 (1932); Walter T. Dunmore, Comment on 
Failure ofAccused to Testify, 26 YALEL.J. 464 (1916); Herbert S. Hadley, Criminal Justice 
in America: Present Conditions Historically Considered, 11 A.B.A. J. 674, 677 (1925); 
Frank H. Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New York, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 
258-62 (1926); Note, Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand, 57 YALEL.J. 145 
(1947). Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court determined that 
violation of the no-comment rule could be subjected to harmless error analysis. See United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding a Grifin violation harmless beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt). 
12' 382 U.S. 406 (1966). 
IZ8 Id. 
12' Id. at 415. 
130 Id. at 414 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,7-8 (1964)). 
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the assistance of the defendant.13' Accordingly, the no-comment rule was interpreted 
to be symbolic. 
The next decision in this area was Lakeside v. 0 r e ~ 0 n . I ~ ~  There, the Court held 
that the giving of a no-inference instruction over objection did not violate the Fifth 
~mendmen t . ' ~~  Ostensibly narrowing the GrifSin rule prohibiting comment on a de- 
fendant's silence, the Court made clear that the only comment on the defendant's 
silence that was prohibited by GrifSin was a negative 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined in part by Justice Marshall, reiterated that the 
right to remain silent at trial was designed, in part, to protect the innocent defendant 
who decides not to testify.'35 For a judge or prosecutor to call that silence to a jury's 
attention in any way "will make the defendant's silence costly indeed."'36 He saw 
no reason to ovemde a defendant's decision as to whether that instruction should be 
given.'37 
Later that same year the Court decided Lockett v. 0 h i 0 . l ~ ~  There, the Court held 
that a prosecutor's references to the state's evidence as "unrefuted and "uncontra- 
dicted," indirect references to the defendant's silence, did not violate the Fifth and 
Fourteenth  amendment^.'^^ In that case, defense counsel had drawn the jury's atten- 
tion to the defendant's silence by stating that she would testify and by outlining her 
defense.I4' The Court held that, "[wlhen viewed against this background, it seems 
clear that the prosecutor's closing remarks added nothing to the impression that had 
already been created by Lockett's refusal to testify after the jury had been promised 
a defense by her lawyer and told that Lockett would take the stand."14' 
13' See id. at 41 6. The Court eloquently explained that the privilege represents "the Consti- 
tution's concern for the essential values represented by 'our respect for the inviolability of 
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may 
lead a private life.""' Id. at 416 & 414 n.12 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 
556,581-82 (1956)). 
'32 435 U.S. 333 (1978). 
L33 Id. at 340-41. 
'" Id. at 338-39. 
It is clear from even a cursory review of the facts and the square holding 
of the Gnfin case that the Court was there concerned only with adverse 
comment, whether by the prosecutor or the trial judge--comment by the 
prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that 
such silence . . . is evidence of guilt. 
Id. (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,615 (1965)). 
13' Id. at 343. 
13' Id. at 347. 
13' Id. 
'38 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
13' Id. at 595. 
Id. 
I4 l  Id. 
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Next, in 1981, in Carter v. ~ e n t u c k y , ' ~ ~  the Court entertained an issue that had 
been specifically reserved in Griffin and Lakeside: whether the state court was re- 
quired, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to give a requested jury in- 
struction that the jury could not draw negative inferences from a defendant's failure 
to testify.'43 The Court held that a requested instruction was constitutionally re- 
q ~ i r e d . ' ~ ~  Concumng, Justice Powell made clear that he felt compelled by Grifin 
to join the Court's conclusion but that he believed Griffin was wrongly decided.'45 
Then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, held that the Court's decision was an erroneous 
extension of Griffin.'46 
In Batter v. ~ a l r n i ~ i a n o , ' ~ ~  the Court held that the use of a defendant's silence in 
a prison disciplinary proceeding did not violate the Fifth An~endrnent.'"~ In doing so, 
however, it explained that "his silence was given no more evidentiary value than was 
warranted by the facts surrounding his case. This does not smack of an invalid attempt 
by the State to compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exer- 
cise of the pri~ilege."'~~ 
Later, in United States v. ~obinson,'~' the Court held that the prosecutor's com- 
ment that defendant could have taken the stand to testify did not violate the Fifth 
A~nendment.'~' Similar to its reasoning in Lockeft, the Court held that the prosecutor's 
comment was a fair response to defense counsel's argument:'52 defense counsel had 
argued that the prosecutor had prevented the defendant from explaining his side of 
the case.lS3 Thus, the Court held that, even though the prosecutor's comment that the 
defendant could have taken the stand and explained his argument to the jury may have 
imposed "some 'cost"' on the defendant for remaining silent, the Fifth Amendment 
had not been vi01ated.l~~ The Court rejected the lower court's position that "any 
'direct' reference by the prosecutor to the failure of the defendant to testify violates 
the Fifth Amendment as construed in  riffi in."'" 
'42 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
14' Id. at 295. 
Id. at 288. 
14' Id. at 307. 
'46 Id. at 3 10. In so holding, Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Harlan's concumng opinion 
in Grifin: "Although compelled to concur in this decision, I am free to express the hope that 
the Court will eventually return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed 
throughout its history." Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965)). 
14' 425 U.S. 308 (1976). 
14' Id. at 309, 3 16. 
'49 Id. at 318. 
''O 485 U.S. 25 (1988). 
IS' Id. at 26. 
Id. at 32. 
Id. at 34. 
Id. 
Id. at 3 1 .  The Court held, "[wle decline to give Griffin such a broad reading, because 
we think such a reading would be quite inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, which protects 
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Finally, in Portuondo v. ~ g a r d , " ~  the Supreme Court addressed the question 
whether a prosecutor's comment during summation-that the defendant had been 
the only witness with the opportunity to be present and hear the other witnesses and 
thus to tailor his testimony-violated the Grifin nocomment rule.157 The Court held 
that it did not, declining to extend Grijf~n."~ Interestingly, it pointed to the lack of 
any historical evidence prohibiting the sort of comment at issue, relying on the long- 
standing disqualification for interest that prohibited a defendant from testifying in 
the first place.Is9 In addition, the Court noted that the comment in Grifin asked the 
jury to do what it was prohibited from doing (using the defendant's silence as evi- 
dence of guilt) while the comment in Portuondo asked the jury to do what it was 
perfectly entitled to do (consider the defendant's presence in evaluating his credi- 
bility).16' Moreover, asking the jury not to consider a defendant's presence was deemed 
by the Court to be imp~ssible.'~' Finally, the Court opined that Grifin prohibited 
comment on the defendant's silence as evidence of guilt, while Portuondo limited the 
comment to credibility. 16' 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, d is~ented. '~~ Relying on Grifin and 
Doyle v. Ohio,164 Justice Ginsburg held that the comments in question violated the 
defendant's constitutional rights because "where the exercise of constitutional rights 
is 'insolubly ambiguous' as between innocence and guilt, a prosecutor may not un- 
fairly encumber those rights by urging the jury to construe the ambiguity against the 
defendant."165 According to Justice Ginsburg, while a trial is a search for truth, a ge- 
neric comment in summation "undermines all defendants equally and therefore does 
not help answer the question that is the essence of a trial's search for truth: Is this 
particular defendant lying to cover his guilt or truthfully narrating his inn~cence?" '~~ 
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg took the majority to task for arguing that the negative 
inference from presence in Portuondo is different from the negative inference from 
silence in Grifin because the inference from silence is not "natural or irre~istible."'~~ 
In doing so, Justice Ginsburg relied on Grifln and Mitchell to show that the Court 
had indeed considered the negative inference from silence natural and irresistible; 
against compulsory self-incrimination." Id. at 3 1-32; see also United States v. Hasting, 461 
U.S. 499,515 (1983). 
529 U.S. 61 (2000). 
Id. at 65. 
Is* Id. at 61. 
lS9 Id. at 65. 
Id. at 68. 
Id. 
Id. at 67-68. 
163 Id. at 62. 
164 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617). 
Id. at 79. 
Id. at 84. 
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indeed, that was why the Court in Carter had required that a limiting instruction be 
given whenever requested by the defense.16' In language that could well apply to 
GrifSin, Justice Ginsburg concluded, "[iln the end, we are left with a prosecutorial 
practice that burdens the constitutional rights of defendants, that cannot be justified 
by reference to the trial's aim of sorting guilty defendants from innocent ones, and 
that is not supported by our case law."169 
3. Extending the Rule to Sentencing 
In 1999, the Court decided Mitchell v. united ~tates. '~'  In Mitchell, the Court ad- 
dressed the question of whether Grifin should be extended to prohibit a negative 
inference against a defendant who does not testify at sentencing.17' The Court held 
that Grifin should be extended to sentencing.I7* 
The charges against Mitchell arose out of a conspiracy to distribute ~0ca ine . I~~  
Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilo- 
grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with three counts of distribut- 
ing cocaine within one thousand feet of a school or playground, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. 5 860(a).174 She pleaded guilty to all four counts, and reserved the right to 
contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count.17' The dis- 
trict court indicated that the drug quantity would be determined at ~entencing. '~~ 
During the plea colloquy, after the government presented the underlying facts, 
the judge asked Mitchell, "Did you do that?' and she responded "[slome of it."'77 She 
stated that although she had been present for one of the transactions charged in the dis- 
tribution count, she had not delivered the cocaine.178 The government maintained that 
she was liable as an aider and abettor.'79 After the court advised her that she might have 
a defense to one count on the theory that she was only present, Mitchell confmed her 
desire to plead guilty and the court accepted her plea; three other co-defendants also 
agreed to testdy.I8O Later at Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the three witnesses adopted 
their trial testimony supplemented by additional evidence about the amount of cocaine 
Id. at 84-85. 
Id. at 88. 
I7O 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
17' Id. at 316-17. 
172 Id. at 317. The Court also held that, in a federal criminal case, a guilty plea does not 
waive the self-incrimination privilege as to sentence. Id. at 321. 
173 Id. at 317. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 318. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
I8O Id. 
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sold by Mitchell.I8l According to this testimony, Mitchell worked two or three times 
a week selling one and one-half to two ounces of cocaine a day from April to August 
1992, and three to five times a week from August 1992 to December 1993.Ig2 From 
January to March 1994 she was one of the people in charge of cocaine distribution.Ig3 
On cross-examination one of the witnesses conceded he had not seen Mitchell on 
a regular basis during these time periods.184 In addition, Mitchell and the government 
both referred to the trial testimony of another of the co-defendants, who attributed a 
total of two ounces of cocaine to Mitchell in 1992.185 Mitchell put on no evidence and 
did not testify.Ig6 
The sentencing court credited the testimony that Mitchell had been a regular drug 
courier and that she had sold more than five kilograms of cocaine, thus requiring a man- 
datory ten-year minimum sentence.18' One of the reasons the court gave for relying 
on the testimony of the codefendants was Mitchell's "not testifying to the contrary."188 
The court sentenced her to a mandatory "minimum of [ten] years imprisonment, [six] 
years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $2OO."Ig9 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.'g0 The court held that 
Mitchell had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by pleading guilty.I9' Judge 
Michel c~ncurred. '~~ He reasoned that any error in drawing an adverse inference from 
Mitchell's silence was harmless because the evidence supported the judge's finding 
on quantity without considering Mitchell's ~i1ence.l~~ 
The Supreme Court disagreed on both issues.'94 First, the Court held that the de- 
fendant's guilty plea did not waive her right against self-incrimination as to sentence 
because a guilty plea does not complete the incrimination process where a defendant 
is yet to be sentenced.195 Although the Court began its opinion by noting the general 
rule that a witness may not teshfy about some subjects and invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination about the details, the Court held that the narrow inquiry at a plea col- 
loquy is not the equivalent of an inquiry into the facts of the crime itself: indeed, at the 
181 Id. 
Id. 
Ig3 Id. 
la4 Id. 
IgS Id. at 318-19. 
Id. at 3 19. 
Ig7  Id. 
IS8 Id. 
lg9 Id. 
I9O Id. 
19' Id. at 3 19-20. 
Iy2 Id. at 320. 
Ig3 Id. at 320-21. 
'94 Id. at 314-15. 
19' Id. at 321. 
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plea colloquy the defendant takes the facts out of controversy, so that under the circum- 
stances, there is "little danger that the court will be misled by selective disclo~ure."'~~ 
Moreover, "[tlreating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would 
be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants."19' Essentially it would convert 
the current accusatorial system into an inquisitorial one, where the defendant is com- 
pelled to assist in her own punishment.lQ8 
The Court also found nothing in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 I that 
contemplated such a broad waiver of the pri~i1ege.l~~ Rule 1 l(c)(3) requires a court 
to ascertain that the defendant understands that he or she is giving up the right to 
self-incrimination at trial.200 The purpose of this rule is to inform the defendant of 
what she is giving up by deciding not to go to trial, but not to elicit a waiver for any 
other  proceeding^.^^' 
With respect to the negative inference, the Court extended its Grifin prohibition 
to sentencing proceedings.202 The Court held that, while negative inferences are avail- 
able in civil proceedings, a sentencing hearing falls within the "criminal case" language 
of the Fifth ~mendment.~'~ Moreover, drawing such an inference would compel a de- 
fendant to participate in her own punishment, which the Court held would violate the 
right against self-in~rimination.~"" 
The Court's holding follows the line ofjurisprudence that places the right to silence 
at the core of the accusatorial system. It does not rely on text or history. Thus, in hold- 
ing that the government may not rely on the defendant to establish his or her own guilt, 
the Court eloquently articulated the importance of the Fifth Amendment privilege to 
the U.S. system of justice: 
The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teach- 
ing that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defen- 
dant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is 
whether the Government has carried its burden to prove its alle- 
gations while respecting the defendant's individual rights. The 
lg6 Id. at315. 
Here, petitioner's statement that she had done "some of'  the proffered 
conduct did not pose a threat to the integrity of factfinding proceedings, 
for the purpose of the District Court's inquiry was simply to ensure that 
petitioner understood the charges and that there was a factual basis for 
the Government's case. 
Id. at 323. 
Ig7 Id. at 324. 
Ig8 Id. at 325 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,541 (1961)). 
lg9 Id. at 323. 
200 Id. 
Id. at 323-24. 
202 Id. at 327. 
'03 Id. at 328-29. 
2W Id. at 329. 
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Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the 
crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in 
this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege.205 
Significantly, however, the Court limited its holding with respect to adverse infer- 
ences only to the essential facts of the charged crime.206 That is, because it relied on 
the linchpin-of-the-accusatorial-process argument, requiring the prosecution to bear 
the burden of proof without the help of the defendant, it did not explicitly discount the 
probative worth of silence as evidence of guilt, or address the other policy or practi- 
cal arguments against the no-comment rule. The Court clearly opted for the role of 
the privilege as requiring the prosecutor to bear the burden of establishing essential 
sentencing-based facts without any help from the defendant."' 
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor 
and  horna as.^'^ Justice Thomas also dissented ~eparately."~ Although Justice Scalia 
agreed with the majority that a guilty plea is not a waiver of the right against self- 
incrimination, Justice Scalia would have held that Mitchell "did not have the right to 
have the sentencer abstain from making the adverse inferences that reasonably flow 
from her failure to testify.""' 
Not surprisingly, the dissent relied heavily on the text and history of the right 
against self-incrimination and, in particular, the circumstances that existed at the time 
the Fifth Amendment was drawn.211 According to the dissent, early colonial courts 
expected a defendant to testify and drew a negative inference from a defendant's si- 
lence.'12 Eventually, state legislatures enacted statutes prohibiting such an inference, 
but that did not elevate the prohibition to constitutional d imens i~n .~ '~  As to Grifin, 
the dissenters explained that, as a matter of constitutional law, Grifin was an aber- 
ration.'14 Indeed, Justice Scalia characterized it as a "wrong turn" that should not be 
extended to sentencing  proceeding^.^^' 
In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his position that Grifin lacked 
historical or logical support.'16 He characterized it as a decision that "constitutional- 
izes a policy choice that a majority of the Court found desirable at the time."217 Justice 
'05 Id. at 330. 
'06 Id. 
'07 Id. 
'08 Id. at 33 1. 
'51 Id. at 341. 
'I0 Id. at 331. 
'" Id. at 332. 
'I2 Id. at 333. 
'I3 Id. at 335. 
'I4 Id. at 332. 
Id. at 336. 
'" Id. at 341. 
'I7 Id. at 343. 
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Thomas concluded that he would be willing to reconsider Grilgin, but since he agreed 
with Justice Scalia that it should not be extended, he joined Justice Scalia's di~sent.~" 
III. THE MODERN U.K. APPROACH 
A. The Modem Debate 
In 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Committee, a part-time advisory committee 
to the Home Secretary, recommended that, although a defendant would be permitted 
to remain silent in the police station and in the courtroom, negative inferences based 
on that silence would be permis~ible.~'~ The Committee's position was that the ex- 
isting rule unduly favored the The recommended change was roundly de- 
nounced by all commentators and was not im~lemented.~~' 
In 1979, the government tried again.222 The Philips Royal Commission was ap- 
pointed to study the question and concluded that the right to silence was essential 
to the accusatorial system and should not be changed.223 According to the Commission, 
changing the rule concerning pre-trial silence might increase the risk to the innocent 
person who was under police suspicion for the first time, and, on the other hand, would 
do nothing to help convict the guilty, who would continue in any event to remain si- 
lent.224 As to the right to silence at trial, the Commission concluded that the principle 
of requiring the prosecution to prove its case did not pennit the use of the defendant 
to make that case and that the defendant should not be penalized by comment if she 
failed to do so.2" This report was adopted by the government, and public debate was 
considered to be at an end.226 
B. Responding to Domestic Terrorism 
In 1987, in what has been characterized as an "odd" turn of events, the Home 
Secretary suddenly announced that there would again be a "public debate about the 
right to silence."227 In a speech given to the Police Foundation, the Secretary queried 
z18 Id. 
219 C m .  LAW REVISION COMM., ELEVENTH REPORT, EVIDENCE, 1972, Crnnd. 4991, at 16. 
220 MICHAEL ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 123-24 
(9th ed., Butterworths 1999). 
221 Michael Zander, You Have No Right to Remain Silent: Abolition of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination in England, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659,665 (1996). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 665-66. 
224 Id. at 665. 
225 Id. at 665-66. 
226 ZANDER, supra note 220, at 125-26; Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British 
Style: A Decade of Experience With Adverse Inferences from Silence, 3 1 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 243,254 (2000). 
227 Zander, supra note 221, at 666. 
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whether the interests of justice were being served by allowing "experienced crimi- 
nals" to refuse to answer "police questions secure in the knowledge that the trial jury 
would never learn of [that silence]."228 As one commentator noted, the thrust of the 
Secretary's position was that, "[bly allowing the exercise of the right to silence to be 
free of logical adverse evidentiary consequences . . . the legal system wrongly afforded 
protection to the guilty rather than the innocent."229 
The Government ultimately issued Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 
1988 (the "Northern Ireland Order"), which changed the rule for all criminal cases in 
Northern Ireland.230 That order permitted, inter alia, the drawing of adverse inferences 
from an accused's failure before being charged or upon being charged to mention any 
fact relied on in his defense at trial.231 The Order also stated that silence could be cor- 
roboration of other evidence.232 The same inferences could be drawn where a suspect 
failed to explain the presence of any suspicious object, substance or mark, or where 
his presence at the scene or at the time of the crime seemed "reasonably suspicious" 
but he failed to explain it.233 The order was not limited to terrorism-related cases, but 
applied to all prosecutions in Northern Ireland.234 
During the next year, the Home Office Working Group issued a report that rec- 
ommended similar provisions for England and Wales, i.e. that a defendant's failure to 
answer questions or to mention a fact later relied on at trial could be used to support 
an inference that his subsequent defense was untrue or to impeach his credibility gen- 
e r a l l ~ . ' ~ ~  It could not, however, be used to support an inference of 
The Government did not adopt this report.237 This was probably due to a public 
climate dominated by concern over several highly publicized miscamages of justice, 
the Guildford Four, the Maguires, and the Birmingham However, when these 
convictions were quashed, a new commission was set up, the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice ("The Runcirnan Corn~nission'~).~~~ The mandate of this Commission 
was to study the entire system of criminal justice, largely to figure out why these mis- 
carriages had occurred, but the right to silence was specifically mentioned in its terms 
of referen~e.'~ Opponents of change argued that permitting a negative inference would 
increase the likelihood of wrongly convicting the innocent either by (1) permitting 
228 Berger, supra note 226, at 253. 
229 Id. 
230 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, 1988, SI 198811987 (N. Ir. 20). 
23' Berger, supra note 226, at 254. 
232 Id. at 254-55. 
233 Id. at 255. 
2" Id. at 254. 
235 ZANDER, supra note 220, at 158. 
236 Id. at 158-59. 
237 Zander, supra note 221, at 666. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 666-67. 
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an inference of guilt based on silence that was not empirically strong; or (2) forcing 
the otherwise vulnerable to testify before the Others argued that a new law 
would shift the burden of proof from the prosecution by requiring a silent defendant 
to give a reason for the silence.%' Proponents argued that the then-existing law ig- 
nored common sense and allowed criminals and terrorists to "make a mockery of [the 
British] system of. . . They also argued that it was reasonable to expect an 
accused person to offer an explanation of incriminating circumstances and thus that 
there was no reason not to allow a jury or court to take the absence of such an expla- 
nation into acco~nt . '~  Proponents disagreed that the new law would abolish the right 
to silence: the right to silence would remain, and no one would be compelled to give 
any evidence.245 
The Runciman Commission reached the same conclusion as the earlier Philips 
Commission and recommended, by a vote of 9 to 2, that the existing right to silence 
be maintained.% However, the Home Secretary announced that he intended to adopt 
the view of the minority.247 According to him, "'The so-called right to silence is ruth- 
lessly exploited by terrorists. What fools they must think we are. It's time to call a 
halt to this charade. The so-called right to silence will be abolished."248 The next year, 
Parliament passed the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (cJPOA).'~~ In that 
statute, the provisions of the Northern Ireland Order were extended to all criminal cases 
in England and ~ a l e s . ~ ~ ~  
Section 34 of that CJPOA permits the drawing of a negative inference based on a 
suspect's failure to mention any fact on which he relies at Thus, for example, 
if a suspect remains silent and then continues that silence as a defendant at trial, no 
negative inference is allowed. However, the Act also permits a negative inference 
to be drawn based on a defendant's failure to testify at trial.252 
The House of Lords upheld this provision in Murray v. Director of Public 
~ rosecu t ions .~~~  Thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights upheld it against 
241 Id. at 665. 
242 Id. at 666. 
243 Chase, supra note 81, at 938 (quoting 237 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1994) 430). 
261 Zander, supra note 221, at 66748,670.  
245 Id. at 666-67. 
246 Id. at 667. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33 (Eng.) [hereinafter "CJPOA]. 
"' Id. 3 34(1). Accordingly, the U.K. version of the U.S. Miranda warnings reads: "You 
do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when ques- 
tioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evi- 
dence." Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Code C, para. 10.5.); ZANDER, supra 
note 220, at 160. 
252 CJPOA 3 35(2); ZANDER, supra note 220, at 4 4 3 4 .  
253 Murray v. D.P.P., [I9921 A.C. 1 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
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a claim that the drawing of adverse inferences from the accused's silence violated 
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human ~ i g h t s . ~  
Several limitations exist in the Act. First, it is clear that a finding of guilt may not 
rest solely on an inference based on the defendant's failure to testify;255 nor may the 
inference assist the prosecution to make out a prima facie case.256 Moreover, a court 
may still instruct a jury against drawing an adverse inference if there is an evidentiary 
basis for doing so or some exceptional factor in the case makes that the fair course to 
take.257 However, no standards for exercising this discretion are laid out in the Act. 
In this connection, the courts have held that the fact that a defendant may decide not 
to testify because he may be cross-examined as to his bad character is relevant, but 
is not in and of itself sufficient to avoid the usual negative inference instru~tion.'~~ 
In 1998, in response to a deadly terrorist bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, the 
British government submitted what was ultimately enacted as the Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1 998.259 This act is applicable only to Northern Ireland 
terrorism prosecutions, which are defined under other, earlier legislati~n.'~' The Act 
pennits a fact finder evaluating alleged membership in a terrorist organization to draw 
adverse inferences from an accused's failure to mention any fact material to any ques- 
tion asked that "he would reasonably [have] been expected to ans~er."'~' The only 
condition is that he be "charged, informed that he might be prosecuted, or was being 
questioned under caution by an officer for a covered ~ffense."'~' Unlike the CJPOA, 
the negative inference is not limited to those trials at which a fact is subsequently relied 
upon by the defendant that had not been mentioned earlier.263 By this extension of the 
earlier Act, the adverse inference can be drawn whenever a suspect fails to provide in- 
formation to the police.'" Interestingly, although the CJPOA was passed under a con- 
servative government, this extension was passed under a liberal 
IV. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
Several reasons help to explain why the United States and the United Kingdom 
have adopted different approaches to the no-comment rule. Chief among them are: 
(1) the difference between U.S. Constitutional supremacy and U.K. Parliamentary 
254 Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1996). 
255 CJPOA 8 38(3); R v. Cowan, (1996) Q.B. 373 (U.K.). 
256 CJPOA 9 34(2)(c); Cowan, Q.B. at 373-74;. 
257 ZANDER, supra note 220, at 444. 
"91 R V. Taylor, 1999 C m .  L.R. 77. 
259 Berger, supra note 226, at 266. 
260 Id. at 266 & n. 101. 
26' Id. at 266 & n. 102. 
Id. at 266. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
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supremacy; (2) the complex problems of federalism in the United States; (3) the U.S. 
historical experience in the protection of individual rights against state encroach- 
ment; (4) the U.K.'s monarchy and class structure; and (5) the U.K.'s exposure to 
domestic terrorism. 
A. Constitutional v. Parliamentary Supremacy 
In the United States, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any law 
passed by Congress is subject to judicial review for constitutionality. If a statute 
is found to be unconstitutional, Congress must enact a new one.266 In the United 
Kingdom, however, until recently, there was no written constitution. Parliament was 
supreme, and there was no provision for judicial review of statutes. If appropriate 
fact finding and new policy judgments dictate the passage by Parliament of a new 
law, no precedent prevents it or effects its contents. 
In the United States, of course, that is not the case. In Gr@n, for example, the 
Court had to wrestle not only with the simple question of whether the no-comment 
rule was wise policy; it had to determine that question in light of its precedent on fed- 
eralism. The first judgment is legislative, the second, judicial. The first is much easier 
to change, as social circumstances change; the second, being bound by precedent and 
laden with federalism concerns, is much more difficult. 
B. Federalism 
One way to look at Grifin is that it was the result of the Court's attempt, through 
selective incorporation, to set a constitutional minimum for state criminal proceedings 
at a time when constitutional protections were otherwise missing from state proceed- 
ings. Much has been written about the selective incorporation debate.267 Briefly, over 
the course of many decisions, the Supreme Court held that most parts of the first eight 
amendments should be absorbed through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause and were thus binding on the states.268 Ultimately, however, as part of that ab- 
sorptive process, the Court held that the full extent of the specific right as it applied 
to the federal courts was also binding on the states.269 Thus, whatever interpretation 
of the specific right applied in the federal courts was also deemed to apply to the states 
through the Due Process Clause. 
As many justices and commentators have noted, this approach was no more than 
a compromise without historical or analyhc It also drastically altered the 
266 Id. at 245-46. 
267 See, e.g., Henry J .  Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. 
L. REV. 929 (1965). 
Id. at 934. 
269 Id. at 933. 
270 Id. at 934. 
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federalist system set up by the Constitution, by virtue of which the states were sup- 
posed to serve as laboratories; the states were to have the freedom to vary their proce- 
dures consistent with a minimum standard of fundamental fairness.27' Arguably, as 
a result of incorporation, the states have been forced into uniformity. 
Of course, the doctrine of incorporation applied only to the Bill of Rights. It did 
not bind the states to federal procedural statutes, rules of evidence, or exercises of the 
federal court's supervisory power. Thus, when Congress passed 18 U.S.C. 8 348 1, 
which abolished the disqualification of the defendant as a witness and included the no- 
comment rule, that new statute applied only to the Federal courts.272 Just like any other 
act of Congress, it had no applicability to state courts. When, in Grifin, the Supreme 
Court was asked to review a state statute that disagreed with the federal statutory no- 
comment rule, it had already decided (in Malloy) that the state and federal Fifth Amend- 
ment standards had to be exactly the same.273 Having taken that step, it was a short 
additional, if erroneous, step to the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment required states 
to adopt the statutory no-inference rule under the doctrine of selective corporation. In- 
deed, that is exactly how the Grifin majority opinion reads: it substitutes the language 
of the Fifth Amendment for the federal statute.274 
C. The Relative Importance of Individual Rights 
As noted above,27s British colonial Americans claimed the rights of British citizens. 
In addition, however, they sought to protect those rights against increasingly intrusive 
encroachments by the far-away monarch. In short, the United States was born out of 
revolt against the arbitrary power of central authority. For more than two centuries, 
the distrust of the state and the protection of the individual from encroachment by 
the state has continued to be a dominant concern in U.S. jurisprudence. Interestingly, 
the Fifth Amendment gained renewed respect during the McCarthy period, when it 
was publicly invoked against the persecution of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee in the period just before Grifin reconsidered its constitutional status.276 
The extent to which geography and location influenced these values is clear. North 
America was far away. Once the British began to use English judges to try the colo- 
nists, or even to require the colonists to be med in England, the injustice became appar- 
ent: they were there and we were here. In addition, North America was very, very big. 
One of the causes of the revolution was the King's refusal to let the colonists settle 
271 Id. at 936-38. 
272 See 18 U.S.C. $3481 (2000). 
273 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,615 (1965). 
274 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613-14 ("If the words 'Fifth Amendment' are substituted for 'act' 
and for 'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected."). 
275 See supra pp. 932-33. 
276 See Friendly, supra note 1,  at 671 (the history of the privilege includes defending it 
"against the opprobrium that Senator Joseph McCarthy and others sought to heap on many 
who properly invoked it"). 
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west of the Appalachian ~ o u n t a i n s . ~ ~ ~  This must of course have seemed arbitrary, 
too, since there was so much land and so much opportunity. The sense of an inherent 
right to this limitless opportunity free from the state's intrusion has always character- 
ized the U.S. personality. 
The United Kingdom's political and geographic experiences are quite different. 
British citizens are, and have always been, subjects. Far from rebelling against cen- 
tralized authority, they consider themselves subjects of the monarchy, the antithesis 
of the U.S. 'individual rights' mentality. Moreover, in comparison to the United States, 
the country is small and densely populated. As a result, U.K. citizens demand more 
of each other, and are willing to give up more to maintain social cohesion. Aside from 
the far-flung, historical empire, there is no open frontier for expansion. 
Socially, of course, the countries are also very different. Throughout most of its 
history, the United States has not had a rigid class structure. Importantly, mobility be- 
tween the classes has always been considered theoretically possible and every indi- 
vidual entitled to seek it. The Horatio Alger story has always been a central cultural 
theme. U.K. society has never been that way. Because of the long-standing class struc- 
ture in England, the English do not have a social experience of limitless opportunity. 
There is little social mobility; thus expectations of any individual's opportunity for 
social mobility are extremely limited. 
D. Domestic Terrorism 
As noted above, the United Kingdom's decision to allow a negative inference 
from silence arose directly in response to IRA terrorism in Northern Ireland.278 The 
changes were first applied in Northern Ireland in 1988; six years later, rising crime rates 
led Parliament to expand the rules to everyone charged with a crime in England and 
Wales, rules that had before only seemed appropriate for terrorists.279 Ultimately, the 
idea simply became more acceptable, and the balance between public safety and indi- 
vidual freedoms dictated the choice by Parliament to permit the drawing of adverse 
inferences from silence in all criminal trials. 
As noted above, the Grifin decision has always been subject to substantial criti- 
cism. Four factors place it in unique jeopardy now. First, commentators and dissenting 
judges have identified its analytical vulnerability, i.e. lack of textual support, its illogic 
and its conflation of statutory and constitutional rules. Second, critics have traced its 
lack of historical support.280 Its text repeatedly has been deemed inconsistent with its 
277 H. COMMANGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 48-50 (8th ed. 1968). 
278 See supra Part 1II.A. 
279 Chase, supra note 81, at 930. 
See supra Part 1I.A. 1 .  
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history, its history with its underlying policy, and its policy inconsistent with its text."' 
Third, the right to silence operates aggressively in opposition to the search for truth.282 
Importantly, as well, it has been recognized many times that the Fifth Amendment 
is uniquely responsive to contemporary events.283 Fourth, given the Court's modem 
conservative leanings, the Fifth Amendment's unique responsiveness to contemporary 
events, and the modem threat of terrorism, it is likely that the conservative course pur- 
sued in the United Kingdom and predicted by Wigmore will occur here.2w The no- 
comment rule may not survive. 
A. Griffin 's Analytic Vulnerability 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, the text of the Fifth 
Amendment does not support the conclusion that it prohibits adverse comment on 
The language prohibits compulsion; in the no-comment situation, the de- 
fendant is not being compelled to testify at 
Moreover, while the Grifin majority viewed jury instructions as a penalty for 
the exercise of the right to silence, in some senses it may cabin the fact-finders use of 
silence in a way that is helpful to the defendant. After Grifin, a judge can instruct the 
jurors that they may not base a guilty verdict on the defendant's silence, that silence 
may only be used in determining the credibility of evidence as to which the defendant 
would have information, and that the prosecution bears the burden of proof nonethe- 
less.287 Without such instructions, a jury could use a defendant's silence to support a 
conclusion of guilt. Even if the comment rule is viewed as a penalty, however, which 
in effect compels a defendant to testify to avoid it, the penalty is too minimal to be of 
constitutional dimension; the inference of guilt from silence is one that the jury will 
draw regardless of a court or prosecutor's comments. 
Closely connected to this criticism is the claim that prohibiting an adverse in- 
ference from silence is illogical. It is undisputed that evidence of a defendant's con- 
duct generally is admissible.288 The evidentiary significance of silence in the face 
of accusation is also well-established.289 When a person remains silent in the face 
of accusation, that conduct is deemed to be acquiescence. The Supreme Court has 
"' See, e.g., Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Adverse Inferencesfrom Silence, 22 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1005,1009-1 1 (1989) [hereinafter DOJ Report]; Friendly, supra note 
1; McKay, supra note 2. 
282 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
DOJ Report, supra note 281, at 1007; Friendly, supra note 1. 
283 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 1, at 677 n.33, and cases cited therein. 
2w See supra note 13. 
285 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331. 
286 Id. at 341. 
287 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,615 (1965). 
288 DOJ Report, supra note 281, at 1010. 
289 Id. at 1049, 1099. 
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also held that, where a defendant testifies but refuses to answer certain questions, that 
silence may be commented upon before the jury.'% Similarly, where a defendant fails 
to testify at his first trial, but testifies at a retrial, his silence at the first trial may be used 
in evidence at his second trial.29' Most recently, the Mitchell majority, while extending 
the no-comment rule to the facts underlying sentence, left open the possibility that 
comment could be made on a defendant's silence as to other facts, implicitly recog- 
nizing that silence can be probative of g~ilt. '~' These rulings indicate that the Court 
may indeed conclude that silence has some evidentiary significance in fact. Moreover, 
it is generally permissible to ask the jury to draw an adverse inference where a party 
fails to proffer a witness or other source of proof that is within his control and that 
could offer favorable, relevant evidence.293 Adverse comment on a party's silence 
is also permitted in clemency cases, deportation proceedings, and prison disciplinary 
actions.'" Yet the no-comment rule essentially requires that jurors leave the natural 
relevance of such evidence behind. 
Moreover, as Justice Scalia so succinctly put it, "in a breathtaking act of sor- 
cery [Grifln] simply transformed legislative policy into constitutional command."295 
While the Court relied upon its then-recent holding in Malloy v. Hogan that the Fifth 
Amendment was to bind the states to the same standards to which it bound the Federal 
Malloy did not apply to statutory standards, but only to constitutional ones. 
Incorporation through the Due Process Clause was never meant to require the states 
to conform to acts of Congress. 
B. Griffin's Lack of Historical Support 
It is difficult to discern historical support for the no-comment rule. Negative in- 
ferences from silence were indeed permitted throughout history until they were prohib- 
ited by statute in 1878.'~~ For most of that history, defendants were disqualified from 
290 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,493 (1917) (upholding jury instruction where 
defendant testified that, "if he has failed to deny or explain acts of an incriminating nature," 
comment and consideration by the jury would be proper "since it is a legitimate inference that, 
could he have truthfully denied or explained the incriminating evidence against him, he would 
have done so"). 
29' Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 
308 (1976). 
292 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 320 (1999). 
293 DOJ Report, supra note 281, at 1010. 
294 For a list of these types of cases, see Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 1337-38 (Scalia, J., dis- 
senting). 
295 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 336. In GrifSin, the Court held that, "[ilf the words 'Fifth Amend- 
ment' are substituted for 'act' and for 'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is 
reflected." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,613-14 (1965). 
296 378 U.S. 1,8-11 (1964). 
297 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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testifying under oath based on interest, but negative inferences at trial were routinely 
drawn from their failure to speak before trial when questioned by a magistrate under 
the Marian Committal Statute.298 In addition, because there was no right to counsel, 
defendants were expected to speak, albeit unsworn; the failure to answer questions 
was deemed to support the conclusion that the defendant could not deny the truth.299 
In any event, without counsel, silence was suicidal, and so most defendants chose 
to 
Thus, at the time the Fifth Amendment was passed, the colonists were concerned 
with something else: the not-so-distant memory of compulsion by oath or torture 
and the then-current unrestrained power of the distant King and his judges.30' Nega- 
tive inferences based on silence were routinely drawn. It is undisputed that the Fifth 
Amendment was not meant to be a mechanism for law reform, but rather to protect 
the individual against the power of the ~ i n g . ~ ' ~  
History establishes that it was not until Congress and the states began to enact 
statutes rescinding the disqualification for interest that the nocomment question ever 
arose.303 Although these statutes were passed, the provision prohibiting adverse in- 
ferences was criticized by uniquely respected judges, professional organizations, and 
 commentator^.^"^ That criticism has continued unabated to the present.305 
Moreover, the privilege itself was created to prevent punishment for religious and 
private beliefs.306 It continued as aprotection against a distant and arbitrary monarch.307 
It gained respect during the McCarthy period as a protection against political perse- 
~ution.~O* One must seriously ask whether these historical contexts and the values they 
represent necessarily required that the privilege and its no-comment rule be adopted 
in full through selective incorporation in state proceedings involving, as they generally 
do, murder, rape, robbery, burglary and other serious crimes.309 Now, of course, the 
question is even more stark; should the history of the privilege in preventing religious 
and political persecution apply in cases involving terrorism? 
298 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
30' See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
'03 See supra Part I.F.2. 
304 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
305 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
3" Friendly, supra note 1, at 678. 
307 HELMHOLZ ETAL., supra note 17, at 13 1-32. 
308 Friendly, supra note 1, at 671. 
309 See id. at 678-79 ("While no one could sustain the thesis that in 1789 the privilege was 
limited to political and religious crimes, neither can anyone demonstrate that it would ever 
have come into existence if its proponents had been murderers and rapists rather than John 
Lilburne in London and William Bradford in Philadelphia."). 
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C. Evolving Supreme Court Standards 
1. The Ascendancy of Accuracy 
Accuracy, fairness, federalism, efficiency, and the protection of the individual 
against the state are all values underlying the U.S. adversary system.310 Over the years, 
the Supreme Court's balance of these values has changed. When Grifin was decided, 
in the Warren Court era, the Court was attempting to create a constitutional minimum 
for the entire country, and the balance favored fairness and individudstate protection. 
The incorporation doctrine reflected this, based as it was on determining which enu- 
merated rights were essential to fundamental fairne~s.~" Grifin was a product of that 
jurisprudential thinking. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court's balance of these factors has changed. As a 
result of incorporation, the Court has had to contend with the effects of its decisions 
on a huge volume of dangerous state crimes, and, in response, has veered away from 
fairness and individual autonomy in favor of state's rights, accuracy, and efficiency. 
No longer concerned about conformity to a minimum of fairness among the states, the 
Court's focus has been on federalism-allowing the states more leeway in setting their 
own criminal justice standards to deal with their own serious public safety concerns.312 
Thus, to the extent that the no-comment rule is not about protecting the innocent 
from wrongful conviction, it will receive less protection.313 It has become a right of 
individual autonomy, a right to be left alone by the government3I4 and a right to re- 
quire the government to "shoulder the entire load."315 None of these values relate to 
accuracy in t r~th-seeking.~~~ 
Indeed, the right to silence interferes with the accuracy, or truth-seeking function 
of a trial. The defendant is one of the best sources of evidence, and is indeed, used as 
the best source of evidence in an inquisitorial justice system. The fact that a defendant 
3'0 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS 111, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PROSECUTING CRIME 5 1-57 (2003). 
311 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
312 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,670 (1984). 
313 Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,415 (1966). 
3'4 Id. at 414 n.12. 
315 Id. at 415. 
3'6 The purpose of the no-comment rule 
is to be found in the whole complex of values that the privilege against 
self-incrimination itself represents, values described in the Malloy case 
as reflecting "recognition that the American system of criminal prose- 
cution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is its essential mainstay. . . . Governments, state and federal, 
are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence inde- 
pendently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge 
against an accused out of his own mouth." 
Id. at 414 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)). 
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may, with impunity, remain silent hinders both investigatory efforts and truth-seeking 
efforts. As such, it is a natural target to those concerned with the threat of terrorism. 
2. The Ascendancy of History and Text 
Another analyhc trend appears to be in the making: the ascendancy of history and 
text over underlying purpose as the basis for constitutional interpretation. For ex- 
ample, in Crawford v. ~ a s h i n g t o n , ~ ' ~  the conservative justices on the Court brought 
to a screeching halt the Court's modem Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as it ap- 
plied to the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay Over 
the course of many decisions over many years, the Court had held that the underlying 
purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure reliability of evidence and thus 
that the admission of hearsay did not violate the Clause as long as the evidence was 
reliable.319 Instead, in Crawford the Court held that history and text supported the 
conclusion that the Confrontation Clause required cross-examination of any hearsay 
evidence that could be characterized as "testimonial," e.g., prior testimony, deposi- 
tions, affidavits, statements to police, and the like, and had no relevance whatsoever 
to any other form of hearsay proof.320 Were a similar abrupt shift in analysis to occur 
with respect to the no-comment rule, its support would be further weakened. 
D. Domestic Terrorism 
One need look no further than the United Kingdom to see that the public threat 
of domestic terrorism can have a major impact on the balance of criminal justice values. 
The first Parliamentary inroads on the no-comment rule were made in Northern Ireland 
in response to IRA terrorism.321 These changes were made despite a background of 
long standing social and political opposition to suggestions for similar change.322 From 
there, the Northern Ireland rules were applied throughout the United ~ i n g d o m . ~ ~ ~  
There is reason to believe that the same re-balancing of values will occur in the 
United States. As noted above, the privilege has been viewed as uniquely responsive 
to contemporary events. Its historical underpinnings would require it to prevent re- 
ligious and political persecution, and even the arbitrary power of the state in state crirni- 
nal prosecutions. But, despite the value of individual autonomy, terrorism may push 
the privilege beyond where it can go. This is what happened in the United Kingdom. 
3'7 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3L8 Id. 
3'9 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,57 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash- 
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
320 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-52. 
321 See supra Part 1V.D. 
322 See supra Part 1II.A. 
323 Id. 
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There are signs that the United States is not immune from these changes. Indeed, 
the passage and extension of the Patriot Act, with its information-gathering provisions, 
and the ultimate acceptance of the President's program of warrantless eavesdropping 
show that increased concern about public safety has already caused a rebalancing of 
 value^.^" This rebalancing has resulted in a new individual-versus-the-state calculus 
and accompanying limitations on personal autonomy. The already vulnerable priv- 
ilege against self-incrimination, particularly its no-comment rule, may well be the 
next victim. 
On the other hand, in Mitchell, the Supreme Court majority took a stand in favor 
of the no-comment rule as an essential component of the U.S. accusatorial system, 
a component of the system that reinforces the government's burden of proof and the 
requirement that it shoulder that burden entirely without the assistance of the de- 
fendant. To continue its narrow margin, the Supreme Court justices in the majority 
should emphasize the consistent historical evidence of that role. Even in its present, 
more conservative and fearful state of mind, mainstream U.S. opinion would likely still 
reject the image of a prosecutor using a defendant's decision to remain silent-the 
statement "Prove your case against me"-as actual evidence of guilt. 
Grifin's no-comment rule has never faced a challenge as daunting as that posed 
by modem domestic terrorism. Although Grifln was recently reaffirmed and extended 
to sentencing in Mitchell, it garnered the narrowest majority, at least one justice is pre- 
pared to overrule it, and three others doubt its analytic integrity. To the extent that the 
Supreme Court's support for the rule is based neither on text nor history, it has been 
criticized and continues to be vulnerable. 
If the United States follows the path the United Kingdom chose to take in response 
to domestic terrorism and retools its individudstate calculus, the nocomment rule may 
not survive. However, the United States has a written Constitutional provision pre- 
venting self-incrimination. And, for several social, demographic, and political reasons, 
individual rights are more valued in the United States than in the United Kingdom's 
equation. As in Mitchell, judicial adherence to core U.S. values concerning the rela- 
tionship of the state and the individual would preserve the no-comment rule. These 
values were present when the United States was formed and are firmly grounded in 
United States history. 
- - -- -- 
3" See, e.g., Bush Holds Press Conference, Aggressively Defends NSA Eavesdropping, 
Patriot Act, WIUTE HOUSE B m ,  Dec. 19, 2005; Maura Reynolds, Renewal of Patriot Act 
Passes Senate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,2006, at Al;  Scott Shane, N.S.A. Audit of Spying Is Not 
Assessing Legality, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 11,2006, at A19; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Speaks 
Up, Leading Others to Challenge Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 1,2006, at Al;  Editorial, This 
Call May Be Monitored. . . , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2005, $4.1 1 ; see also Douglas C .  McNabb 
& Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, The President, and the NSA: National Security Agency 
Intercepts Within the United States, THE CHAMPION, March 2006, at 10. 
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